Congress Should Address the Issue of Provisional Remedies for Intellectual Property Disputes Which are Subject to Arbitration by Fraser, John A., III
Congress Should Address the Issue of Provisional
Remedies for Intellectual Property Disputes
Which are Subject to Arbitration
JOHN A. FRASER, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a great need for clarity in the laws protecting and fostering
intellectual property, especially in a country that seeks to attract and retain
valuable research and development (r&d) projects.' Because emerging
forms of intellectual property may be worth hundreds of billions of dollars
of national income and produce millions of jobs, a number of countries
have recently recognized the importance of clear and reliable rules for
intellectual property in international competition for new investment.2
Moreover, a recent dominant trend in commercial transactions causes
intellectual property disputes to be frequently resolved through private
commercial arbitration. 3 These two trends (toward sharp international
* Managing Director & Counsel, Kroll Associates, Washington, D.C.
1 For example, the House Judiciary Committee, in reporting out the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 for final action, described its intention to protect aid foster
growth in the U.S. economy by carefully and thoroughly defining trade secrets and
providing new federal statutory protections for trade secrets as a form of intellectual
property. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4-6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N
4021.
2 See Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends & Directions, 18
Loy. L.A. INr'L. & COMp. L.J. 431, 431 (1996) (stating that a country "hungry for
technology" learns to protect intellectual property); New Intellectual Property Law in
Brazil, 8 No. 7 J. PROPRmETARY RTs. 34 (1996) (describing new Brazilian intellectual
property law and the purpose of attracting new r&d investment in pharmaceuticals);
Virtually Fantastic, THE EcoNoMIsT, Mar. 1, 1997, at 67-68 (describing new
Malaysian government effort to create Multimedia Super Corridor and "intellectual
property protection park" to attract research and development to Malaysia).
3 See William Grantham, The Arbitrability of International Intellectual Property
Disputes, 14 BERELEY J. INT'L LAw 173, 182 (1996); Camille A. Latumo,
International Arbitration of the Creative: A Look at the World Intellectual Property
Organization's New Arbitration Rules, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 357, 370 (1996); E.
Charles Routh, Dispute Resolution-Representing the Foreign Client in Arbitration and
Litigation, SBO4 ALI/ABA 571, 577-578 (1996) (listing growing international
arbitration practice centers in Sweden, Canada, U.S., Australia, Malaysia, etc.); Nancy
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competition for r&d investments and toward arbitration of intellectual
property disputes) overlap in a well-developed public policy favoring
protection of intellectual property in arbitration.4
The United States is a strong national competitor for new r&d
investment and also has acted through Congress and the courts to support
the freedom of parties to arbitrate intellectual property disputes. 5 In the
United States, one result of the trend toward arbitration of intellectual
property disputes has been the clarification of the importance of
"provisional remedies" 6 in arbitration of such disputes. 7 However, despite
the clear need for provisional relief, there is a substantial split in U.S.
authority as to the availability to arbitral parties of injunctive relief and
other provisional remedies. 8 In the international competition for new r&d
investments, the United States is thus partially handicapped by some of its
own courts.
Yeend & Cathy Rincon, ADR and Intellectual Property: A Prudent Option, 36 IDEA
601, 602 (1996).
4 See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765-
777 (stating that 1982 Patent Act amendments permitting arbitration of patent disputes
will "enhance the patent system" and "encourage innovation.") Congress also found
that the "numerous advantages of arbitration" over litigation included cheapness, speed,
flexibility and the trade and technical expertise of arbitrators. Id.
5 See Grantham, supra note 3, at 214-216 (setting out cases in U.S. courts
supporting arbitrability of intellectual property disputes); Joseph T. McLaughlin,
Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REv. 905, 939 (1996)
(discussing trend toward arbitration of intellectual property disputes); Jennifer Mills,
Note, Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Intellectual Property Disputes, 11
OmHo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 227, 228 (1996) (describing U.S. and international trend).
6 "Provisional remedies" include injunctions, status quo orders, seizures, arrests,
attactiments, garnishments, replevin, sequestration, stays, escrow, bonds, security and
orders for sale of perishable goods. See Douglas Reichert, Provisional Remedies in the
Context of International Commercial Arbitration, 3 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAw. 368, 371
(1986). In this Article, the term "provisional remedy" will be used in lieu of other
terms, including "interim relief" and "pre-award relief."
7 In 1996, one practitioner summarized the demonstrated need for provisional
remedies as "compelling" and said that with intellectual property cases the need for
provisional measures would "accelerate." David E. Wagoner, Interim Relief in
International Arbitration: Enforcement is a Substantial Problem, Disp. RESOL. J., Oct.
1996, at 68, 72 (1996).
8 See cases discussed infra Section III. For example, some courts that do not
hesitate to enjoin infringement of intellectual property rights in lawsuits will withhold
the same relief to arbitral parties in intellectual property cases.
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The minority of courts that withhold provisional remedies in arbitration
do so in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York
Convention of 1958 (Convention).9 There is a vast literature on the need
for provisional remedies in arbitration, and on the need for the Supreme
Court to resolve the split in the appeals courts.10 This Article has little to
add to that body of advocacy. Instead, the purpose of this Article is to urge
Congress to enact amendments to the FAA that will resolve the issue and
remove the handicap.
In order to demonstrate the need for the proposed amendments,
intellectual property disputes will be analyzed as the primary examples of
the ill effects of current confusion over this issue. Following from this case
analysis, specific statutory amendments to clarify the law and policy
arguments in support of the proposed amendments are offered in Sections
IV and V.
Analysis of the provisional remedy issue leads to the conclusion that
Congress can remove a needless competitive handicap in the competition
for new r&d investment and fulfill American obligations under international
treaties, by enacting the proposed amendments. Through the same
amendments, Congress can attract r&d investments to the United States.
The new legislation would also make it easier for attorneys and businesses
to predict the outcome of commercial arbitration disputes and reduce the
costs of conducting commercial arbitrations in the United States. Overall,
the amendments would greatly strengthen and reinforce the arbitration
policy choices made by Congress in the last seventy years.
I1. THE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION SETTING FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES
Arbitration of commercial disputes arising in interstate and international
commerce is commonplace. 11 In the last twenty years, the United States has
9 See infra Section IV.
10 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CoMMRcIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNrrED
STATES 753 n. 1 (1994) (citing to academic literature on provisional remedies law in the
United States). A recent summation of the law of provisional remedies is found in
Charles H. Brower, II, What I Tell You Three Times is True: U.S. Courts and Pre-
Award Interim Measures under the New York Convention, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 971, 976-
997 (1995). Section IV of this Article presents a brief summary of the appellate cases
which address these issues.
11 See Tom Arnold, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Cases,
in PATENT LITIGATION 1991, at 437, 449 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 321, 1991). Arnold reported that the
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joined a global trend toward allowing privately appointed arbitrators to
finally resolve intellectual property disputes between private, commercial
parties. 12 Thus, intellectual property is commonly the subject of
commercial arbitration in the global economy, and arbitration rulings
frequently resolve who has what rights to many forms of intellectual
property. 13
Commercial parties transacting business in interstate and international
commerce designate private arbitration as the exclusive means of dispute
resolution in order to save costs, prevent delay, preserve commercial
privacy and obtain a better "quality" of decisions. 14 For example, many
experienced legal practitioners assert that expert arbitration panels produce
better decisions than federal courts and juries in patent cases. 15 Many
owners of intellectual property, including licensees who pay for use of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) and the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS) together received over
100,000 arbitration cases per year. See William K. Slate, II, International Arbitration:
Do Institutions Make A Difference?, 31 WAKE FoRs'r L. REv. 41, 47-52 (1996)
(presenting a description of frequency of arbitration of disputes).
12 See Grantham, supra note 3, at 199-220 (surveying the international trend and the
U.S. role in the trend). Leading cases supporting arbitration of intellectual property
disputes include Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191
(7th Cir. 1987) (copyrights); Rhone-Poulenc Specialties Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769
F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (patents); Kamikazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp.,
684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982) (copyrights).
13 See generally supra note 5.
14 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 11, at 450-453, 457-458 (stating that advantages
for intellectual property cases include cost, time, quality, contractual freedom and
confidentiality); Mark A. Buchanan, Public Policy and International Commercial
Arbitration, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 512 (1988) (stating that arbitration is preferred
dispute resolution method in international transactions); James H. Carter, Dispute
Resolution and International Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS
1995, *at 435, 439-440 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
726, 1995) (listing predictability, competence, party participation, finality, enforceability,
costs, and privacy as reasons for preference for commercial arbitration); Paul E. Mason,
International Commercial Arbitration: A Corporate Counsel's View, 13 ACCA Docket 8,
8-9 (1995) (listing advantages of arbitration over national court systems, including time,
cost, expert neutrals and privacy, among others).
15 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 11, at 444-446, 450-453.
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property, prefer arbitration to the relatively high-cost and relatively low-
quality litigation solution offered in the U.S. court system. 16
The general commercial preference for arbitration has the full support
of U.S. public policy as reflected in the United States Code. In the 1925
FAA, Congress required federal and state courts to honor the written
election of arbitration in commercial transactions. 17 In 1970, the Senate
ratified the New York Convention, which requires all signatory countries to
honor and enforce arbitration agreements and awards in international
commerce.' 8 In 1971, Congress enacted Chapter 2 of the FAA,
implementing the New York Convention through the United States Code.19
Then, in 1982, Congress amended the Patent Act to provide for private
arbitration of patent disputes.2 0 Moreover, in the last twenty years, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded the lower courts that arbitration is
a choice favored by the public policy of the United States, as evidenced by
treaty and statute. 2 1
In short, the legal setting in the United States is clearly favorable to
commercial arbitration, including the use of arbitration to resolve
intellectual property disputes. The legal setting is so favorable that practical
legal treatises and formbooks contain a number of examples of arbitration
16 See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, supra note 4, at 13 (describing superiority of
arbitration to litigation for patent disputes).
17 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1994). Congress intended to overrule all common law
hostility to arbitration in transactions affecting commerce and to enlist the courts in the
task of assisting in the maintenance of a strong arbitration system. See H.R. REP. No.
68-96, at 1-2 (1924).
18 See Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
19 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994).
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1994) (codifying Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 17(b)(1), 96 Stat.
317, 322 (1982)).
21 See generally Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52
(1995) (stating that a punitive damages claim is arbitrable); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that the FAA preempts state laws that
prohibit arbitration permitted by the FAA); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that securities law claim under 1933 Securities
Act is arbitrable); Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(holding civil racketeering and securities laws claims subject to arbitration contract);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(enforcing promise to arbitrate an antitrust claim); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974) (finding that the FAA requires enforcement of contract to arbitrate
securities dispute in international commerce). Additional decisions on arbitrability are
reviewed in McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 907-915.
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clauses specifically crafted to deal with intellectual property disputes.22 The
case reports of the last decade also show that a number of pending
commercial contracts contain well-designed dispute resolution provisions
for such disputes. 23
Although the setting is favorable, there are some practitioners that
express continuing practical objections to arbitration as a means to resolve
commercial disputes in general, including intellectual property disputes. 24
Serious reservations about arbitration include the necessity for anticipating
the outlines of future disputes in selecting a proper forum and governing
law, and the difficulty of anticipating needs for discovery and disclosure in
arbitration. 25 However, these objections can be overcome through drafting
and negotiation of particular contracts. 26
Another more serious objection is that some American courts withhold
provisional remedies from parties that have elected to arbitrate disputes. 27
Because some courts cite lack of subject matter jurisdiction as the reason to
2 2 See, e.g., ROBERT M. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION wITH FoRMs § 26.2
(1995); Tom Arnold, Suggested Form of Contract to Arbitrate a Patent or Other
Commercial Dispute, 2 TFx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 205 (1994); James S. Hilboldt, Jr.,
The Patent License: Key Clauses, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING & LSG. 1996, at 293,
326-328 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 431, 1996) (model arbitration clause); Reichert, supra note 6, at
395-396 (describing drafting solutions for provisional remedies issue and suggesting
that Supreme Court resolve conflict in appellate decisions to make the drafting solutions
workable).
23 See, e.g., Remy Amerique v. Touzet Distribution, 816 F. Supp. 213, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (regarding arbitration clause for international distribution agreement for
wines, spirits and liquors); Compuserve, Inc. v. Vigny Int'l Finance Ltd., 760 F. Supp.
1273, 1276-1277 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (concerning arbitration clauses for international
trademark and servicemark disputes).
24 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 14, at 440-444 (describing drawbacks of arbitration);
Reichert, supra note 6, at 395-396 (stating that reservation is due to the inability of
drafting solutions to address split in court decisions); Routh, supra note 3, at 578 (listing
unavailability of preliminary relief as reason for not using arbitration clause in particular
agreement where parties may need that relief).
25 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 14, at 443-444.
26 See Arnold, supra note 22, at 216.
27 See Arnold, supra note 11, at 456-457; Carter, supra note 14, at 441-442;
Hilboldt, supra note 22, at 328; Reichert, supra note 6, at 395-396; Routh, supra note
3, at 578.
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refuse provisional relief, this objection cannot be resolved through careful
drafting. 28
Various attempts have been made to draft around the failure of some
courts to provide provisional remedies to arbitral parties. These include
express contractual provisions authorizing provisional remedies,
incorporation of arbitration rules that authorize provisional relief, contract
authorization of immediate relief once arbitrators are appointed, recitations
of the importance of a timely remedy and stipulations that money damages
will not be an adequate remedy. 29 All of these drafting solutions fail when
the arbitrators have not been appointed, or when the courts deny
jurisdiction to hear requests for provisional relief.30 Jurisdiction can not be
conferred by the drafting efforts of private parties, and by definition,
unappointed arbitrators cannot grant relief.
In conclusion, the general setting is very favorable, but there is a flaw
that no amount of careful legal work can overcome. Some courts in the
United States simply will not provide provisional remedies to arbitral
parties. Because this flaw is serious and long-standing and is not likely to
be overcome by Supreme Court action (Section IV, below) Congress
should overrule this remnant of judicial hostility to arbitration (Section V
below). Intellectual property cases clearly demonstrate the consequences of
a failure of provisional remedies, and to that subject we now turn in Section
mI.
III. THERE IS A PECULIAR NEED FOR PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES, IN OR OUT OF ARBITRATION
The core element of all forms of intellectual property is the right to
exclude other persons from use of the property. 31 Trademarks, patents,
28 See infra Section IV.
29 See Reichert, supra note 6, at 395-396; see also infra notes 53-54.
30 See D. Alan Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts: Interim Measures of
Protection-Is the 7Tde About to Turn?, 30 Tax. INT'L L.J. 71, 76, 83 (1995).
31 See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(patents); OECD, COMpETrTON AND INTELL.CTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTs 11 (1989)
("[Tihe ability to exclude imitation is the most important aspect of the property rights
granted to the innovator."); see also Zachinni v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 575-576 (1977) (finding that value of human cannonball performance
was largely determined by ability to exclude others from broadcasting the performance
without permission); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974)
(holding that states may protect intellectual property by excluding other persons from
use so long as they do not contradict patent and copyright laws); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (upholding state statute that prohibited acts of
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trade secrets and copyrights are commercially valuable not because of any
inherent value, but because a functioning legal system will protect the right
of the owners to control possession and use. 32
In intellectual property disputes, where control of the use of the
property is the key issue, normal legal remedies (including monetary
damages, restitution and disgorgement of profits) are inadequate because
they do not preserve the exclusive use of the property.33 Thus, specific
performance and other affirmative injunctive remedies are commonly
awarded in intellectual property cases because the common legal remedies
will not vindicate the property owner's rights-the remedy will not be
.piracy" in copying musical records without permission); Int'l News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241 (1918) (finding value of news is diminished if
courts will not exclude immediate re-use by competitor); H.R. REP. No. 104-788,
supra note 1, at 4 ("The value of [trade secret] information is almost entirely dependent
on it being closely held."); Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L.
Ruv. 357, 373 (1954) ("[Plroperty is a relationship [in which] the so-called owner can
exclude others from certain activities or permit others to engage in those activities and
in either case secure the assistance of the law in carrying out his decision.").
32 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36-39 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing patents, trademarks and copyrights). This concept can be understood by
reference to the distinction between unpatentable concepts of "pure" mathematics and
the patented algorithms at the heart of advanced computer software. See Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972) (holding that pure mathematical algorithms cannot
be patented). But see Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958
F.2d 1053, 1060-1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that an algorithm that can be described
to the Patent Office as having been incorporated in an operating system or device can be
patented); In re Iwashashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374-1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that the
difference is in the manner of description of the invention in the patent claims submitted
to the Patent Office). Thus, the material difference is in the willingness of legal
authorities to provide protection for some claim descriptions and not others. Some
algorithms are patentable inventions. Compare Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-592
(1978) (holding unpatentable an algorithm that the Court deemed to be a "basic tool" of
science), with In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (holding that an
algorithm is patentable as part of process patent).
33 See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The essence of all
property is the right to exclude. . . ."); Smith Int'l v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d
1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that purpose of injunction is to preserve
exclusivity); see also DAN A. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 446, 486,
697-698 (1973) (discussing inadequacy of legal damages for copyrights, trademarks and
trade secrets).
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"adequate. " 34 Because intellectual property is intangible in its basic nature,
the ability to exclude other persons from unprivileged or unlicensed
possession and use of the property is the practical means of defining what is
the property of one person versus other persons, and what interests can be
transferred. 35 Intellectual property can be repeatedly sold and transferred in
whole or in part because it is inherently capable of being possessed and
used by more than one person at the same time. 36 Regimes of licensure and
implied permission define the extent to which the owner of intellectual
property can derive rent or other benefits from transfers of interests less
than outright sale of the property.37
However, an owner of intellectual property will be able to derive
maximum value from the property to the extent that the owner can:
(1) suppress the property and exclude others; 38
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1994) (authorizing injunctions for trademark cases); 17
U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (authorizing copyright injunctions); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994)
(authorizing injunctions in patent cases); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-924, § 1, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (authorizing Attorney General injunctive powers in
trade secret cases); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-788, supra note 1 (describing reasons
for injunctive powers, including lack of adequate remedies under prior law).
35 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918)
(Holmes J., dissenting) ("Property depends upon exclusion by law from
interference .... "); Connell, 722 F.2d at 1548 (citing Schenck v. Norton Corp., 713
F.2d 782 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that the right to exclude from use is the "essence" of
the patent property)); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir.
1929) ("In the absence of some recognized right at common law, or under the
statutes... a man's property is limited to the chattels which embody his invention.
Others may imitate these at their pleasure."); DOBBS, supra note 33, at 698 (discussing
how injunctions in trade secret cases serve dual purpose of defining property boundaries
and providing a remedy).
36 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. of America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1992) (living performer had right to prevent unauthorized copying of her
distinctive image and identity in the form of a robot).
37 See OECD, supra note 31, at 11 (stating that licensing can be the only source of
income for an innovator that cannot itself exploit the invention). For example, licensing
rules and practices for copyrights deprive owners of all claims for royalties for uses that
are deemed to be "fair use," but prohibit other forms of unlicensed uses. Trademark
protection is terminated when a mark becomes generic. See RiCHARD A. PosNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38-45 (4th ed. 1992).
38 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271 (1994); see also Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 426-430 (1908). An illustration of this is a
patentee who chooses not to practice the patent during the term of the patent grant and
not to license. The right not to practice or license the patented invention is protected by
the patent laws.
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(2) retain use of the property and maintain control of the use by
others; 39
(3) sell the intellectual property and warrant exclusivity;4° or
(4) define and control the uses of the property by a number of other
persons. 41
Formally, the owner of intellectual property may have a complete
bundle of rights and privileges. For example, an original work of art may
be fully protected from any unauthorized use when the work is kept in a
closet, but if it is placed on public display or sold through reproduction,
control over disposition or use of the work is completely dependent on the
availability of legal remedies to enforce exclusivity and other terms of
agreed transactions. Put differently, the absence of a timely legal remedy to
enforce an aspect of ownership practically eliminates that aspect of
ownership. 4 2
For intellectual property, the availability of immediate legal remedies is
vital. In the commercial arbitration context, immediately available remedies
are called "provisional remedies" or "interim relief." These
39 This is illustrated by an inventor who chooses not to patent, chooses not to
license and secretly practices the invention, while prosecuting any theft of the trade
secret.
40 This is an assignment or an exclusive license, depending on additional terms.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271 (1994) (granting the right to assign or exclusively license a
patent).
41 This is a nonexclusive license.
42 See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that irreparable harm is presumed once infringement of a valid patent is shown,
because the usual legal remedies cannot restore exclusive use, which is the "principal
value" of the right to exclude); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that irreparable injury is presumed in
copyright cases because of the need to exclude unauthorized uses); Frisch's Restaurants,
Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 649-650 (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding that irreparable harm is presumed in trademark cases when unlicensed use is
shown); see also Zachinni v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(permitting state to define performance as exclusive property of human cannonball
actor, and to ban broadcast for commercial purposes); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1930) ("Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by
patent or trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by all ... ."); RCA Mfg. Co.
v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding that copyright consists of the
power to exclude others from reproducing the copyrighted work, and does not permit an
owner to prohibit radio performance of his music).
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interchangeable labels include all legal remedies that are available to define
and protect the rights of parties on a temporary basis, prior to a final
arbitral decision. 43
If a timely remedy is not available to define and enforce the exclusivity
of intellectual property, much of the value of the property will evaporate. A
few examples will suffice to illustrate the critical importance of provisional
remedies in defining what is or is not intellectual property:
1. A secret customer list is taken without permission and utilized by
a competitor. In the absence of a timely remedy to prevent competitive
use, the secret customer list is merely the functional equivalent of a
licensed mailing list.44 Where damages constitute the only remedy,
damages define the license fee, and the right to secret (exclusive) use is
utterly lost.
2. A competitor uses a patented process without permission and
undercuts the patent holder in the marketplace by selling the same
product at a lower price. In the absence of a prompt remedy restoring
exclusivity of use, the patentee's rights will be converted to a
compulsory license to the competitor, with the fee determined by the
damages award. 45
3. A "pirate" or other unauthorized manufacturer of trademarked
goods operates in three countries. Country A is in political chaos and
has no operating legal system. However, the pirate is identified and
43 It is not possible to list all of the types of provisional relief that may be required
to vindicate the contractual rights of a party. See, e.g., Ferry-Morse Seeds, Inc. v.
Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1984) (requiring the continued sale of seed
corn for seasonal sales); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d
Cir. 1972) (ordering that a basketball player not play for any other team); Albatross
S.S. Co. v. Mannin Bros., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (ordering the arrest
and seizure of vessels in admiralty proceedings). The emergence of arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution in intellectual property matters has led to the recognition of
the importance of provisional remedies that protect confidentiality during the arbitration
process. See Charles S. Baldwin, IV, Protecting Confidential and Proprietary
Commercial Infortation in International Arbitration, 31 Tx. INT'L L.J. 451, 460-465
(1996).
44 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048,
1054 (4th Cir. 1985).
45 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbot Labs, 849 F.2d 1446, 1449, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(denying injunction to enforce patent due to public health concerns); Foster v. American
Machine & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (denying injunction in
favor of compulsory license scheme for equitable reasons).
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brought before the legal authorities of Countries B and C, and is
ordered to cease unauthorized use of the trademark in Country B. A
decision of the same issue is postponed for a year in Country C. The
owner of the intellectual property has no effective ownership rights in
Country A and seriously eroded rights, if any, in Country C.46
4. Company S contracts with Company W to develop a new, secret
technology and to treat the jointly-developed intellectual property as the
property of a joint venture. Company W attempts to sell the jointly-
developed intellectual property without the consent of Company S, and
a court refuses to enjoin the sale. Company S is without any effective
remedy to vindicate the full value of the intellectual property rights that
the venture was to create and manage. 47
5. Press Enterprise X invests large sums in collecting and analyzing
current news events and transmits its reports to paying customers on a
confidential basis. Competing Press Enterprise Y, with no similar
investment or effort, simply repackages the reports and analyses of X
as its own product and sells the same information in the same market
on a brief time-delay basis. In the absence of a remedy that stops Y
from exploiting the time-value of the X reports and analyses, X will
have a much diminished market for its reports.48
In each of these cases, the availability (or lack thereof) of provisional
remedies will precisely define the boundaries of the property in question. A
secret customer list is converted from one form of property to another
when an immediate remedy for its unauthorized use is not available. A
compulsorily licensed patent is narrower than a patent over which the
patentee retains complete license discretion. Jointly-developed machine
designs which are sold to a third party competitor are not trade secrets after
the sale.
46 This hypothetical describes a range of trademark enforcement regimes that
appear to exist around the world at the present time. See Mladen Singer, How
Trademark Practitioners Perceive the Availability of Provisional Remedies for
Infringement: A World-Wide Survey, 36 IDEA 67 (1995).
47 See generally Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348 (7th
Cir. 1983).
48 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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Another important feature of intellectual property is that much of the
evidence of infringement of the owners' rights is ephemeral and transitory.
Impermissible copies of software can be secreted, erased and transported in
milliseconds. 49 Factories that manufacture counterfeit trademarked goods
can shut down in one country and start up in another, leaving little or no
trace of their operations. Because of the relatively short "shelf-life" of
many forms of intellectual property, 50 the continued ability of unlicensed
users to use the property without danger of loss from effective short term
remedies greatly reduces the value of the property. 51
Legal practitioners who represent owners of intellectual property
understand the importance of provisional remedies.52 Practitioners use a
variety of devices to signal to courts and arbitrators that the intellectual
property in dispute is valuable because of the availability of timely
enforcement. These devices include a stipulation that damages are not an
adequate remedy for a breach of a license agreement, 53 and a clause
directly authorizing injunctions and other affirmative relief.54
49 See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, supra note 1, at 5 (citing reasons for new criminal
penalties for trade secret theft).
50 See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that one advantage of
patent arbitration is speed of proceedings as compared to litigation).
51 Fashion dictates the brief seasons of demand for musical intellectual property.
When a compact disc is in demand for ninety days and demand then plummets, the
ability of a copyright holder to exploit all markets for ninety days (without being
undercut by unlicensed copying) will define the commercial value of the copyrighted
music. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5721 (stating that the exclusive rights of owner of copyrighted music are limited
and do not include right to bar imitated or simulated performances).
52 See, e.g., Charles Hunnicut et al., Report to the Washington Foreign Law
Society on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 3 Omo
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 303, 312-315 (1988) (discussing that a committee of
practitioners reported on a need for change in provisional remedies law).
53 See Jill S. Riola, Drafting the Software Licensing Agreement, in PATENT
LrIGATION 1995, 233, 243 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 418, 1996) (noting that model software license
includes stipulation to lack of adequate legal remedies and irreparable harm); Steven M.
Weinberg, The Basics of the Law and Business of Licensing, in PATENT LrrIGATIoN
1996, at 63, 66 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 445, 1996) (noting that model agreement includes clauses
stipulating to irreparable harm, inadequate remedy at law and propriety of injunctive
relief).
54 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d
1048, 1051 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting contract authorizing injunctive relief prior to
arbitration); Reichert, supra note 6, at 395-396 (suggesting such a clause).
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Yet another indication of the importance of provisional remedies in
defining what is valuable in intellectual property can be found in recent
state enactments regarding arbitration. The different states of the United
States compete to attract arbitration business and research and development
investments. 55 Several of the recently enacted state laws on international
commercial arbitration plainly authorize the entry of provisional remedies
as a form of assistance to the arbitrators and the parties. 56 Those
jurisdictions that have studied the competitive international market for r&d
investments have concluded that commercial disputes will be better
resolved in an environment where provisional remedies are available.
57
The formal, published rules that govern commercial arbitrations in
interstate and international commerce reflect the universal favorable
judgment of experienced parties and institutions in regard to provisional
remedies. 58 The rules uniformly provide that the parties to an arbitration
may control provisional remedies through their contracts, and may seek
provisional remedies from courts without detracting from their commitment
to arbitrate. 59 The most recently adopted rules, those of the World
55 See William P. Mills, III, State International Arbitration Statutes and the U.S.
Arbitration Act: Unifying the Availability of Interim Relief, 13 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 604,
646 (1990); George K. Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International
Arbitration, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 419, 459-460 (1992).
56 See Walker, supra note 55, at 432-433 & n.48.
57 See Mills, supra note 55, at 636 (discussing new state laws for international
arbitration).
5 8 See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, Rule 34; AAA INTERNATIONAL RULES, Rule
22(3); AAA PATENT RULES, Rule 33; ICA RULES, Art. 8(5) (1988); AAA SECURmTE
RULES, Rule 10; INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION RULES,
Art. 26(3); NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION, § 32(d)(1); NYSE Arb. Rule 619(d)(1);
UNCITRAL RULES, Article 26(1); Uniform Arbitration Act § 20(d)(1) (authorizing
provisional remedies); Note, 25 TEx. INT'L L.J. 43, 61 (1990) (discussing use of
UNCITRAL Model Law as basis for revision of FAA, including provisional remedies);
In addition to the arbitration rules discussed herein, it should also be noted that
UNCITRAL adopted a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 40 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (no. 17) Annex I; 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985). Article 17 of the UNCITRAL
Model Law specifically authorizes courts to enter provisional relief at the request of
arbitral parties. See 24 I.L.M. at 1302-1313.
59 The primary reasons that the arbitration rules are uniform in this area are (1)
institutions such as the AAA or the ICA can take weeks or months to identify and
appoint appropriate panels of expert arbitrators, and (2) some provisional remedies must
be available against recalcitrant parties who use delay and noncooperation as a cover for
continuing violations of the material rights of other parties. See KLAUS P. BERGER,
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), expressly approve of the use of
provisional remedies in intellectual property disputes. 60
A. Analysis of the Reported Cases of Intellectual Property
Arbitration
Finally, the reported cases involving provisional remedies and
arbitration strongly demonstrate the value of those remedies for the
continued vitality of intellectual property. Review of the cases shows that,
without provisional remedies to prevent opportunistic erosion and
destruction of intellectual property, a commitment to arbitrate intellectual
property disputes in the United States could be a poor strategic choice for
investors in intellectual property.
Leading provisional remedy cases will be discussed from each field of
intellectual property. In the field of trade secrets, the leading case is Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley,61 which involved an
employee who took vital trade information to a competitor. In the area of
trademarks and service marks, the case of Compuserve, Inc. v. Vigny
International Finance Ltd.62 will serve as the example.
The dependence of patents on provisional remedies will be discussed
using Feny-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc.,63 which involves a
licensed type of seed. Provisional remedies in copyright matters will be
discussed using the facts of Performance Unlimited v. Questar Publishing,
Inc.64
The international aspects of intellectual property disputes will be
illustrated through two cases that involved allegations that American
companies had agreed to arbitration as a binding contract remedy, but then
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBmAnioN 347-351 (1993) (explaining overarching role
of courts in maintaining and enforcing arbitral parties' essential rights before and during
arbitration). Just as the courts serve an essential role in compelling arbitration by
recalcitrant parties, they also serve an essential role in preserving the parties' material
rights (as defined by contract) pending appointment and hearing before the arbitral
tribunal. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053-1054 (noting that in the absence of injunctive
relief for trade secrets, the arbitration would be a "hollow formality").60 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: MEDIATION,
ARErRATION AND EXPEDrIED ARwrrRATION RuLEs Art. 46, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 559,
575-576 (1995).
61 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
62 760 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
63 729 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1984).
64 52 F.3d 1373 (6th Cir. 1995).
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engaged in unilateral destruction of the value of the underlying intellectual
property before arbitration could be had. Those cases are Sauer-Getriebe
KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc.65  and Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz
Aktiengesellschaft, Koln v. Hewitt-Robins Division of Litton Systems, Inc.66
Both Sauer and Klockner demonstrate the dependence of research and
development investors on provisional remedies, and how the absence of
such remedies can seriously discourage investment in research and
development in the United States.
1. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley67
In this case, a securities trading firm and an account executive signed a
variety of employment agreements containing numerous commitments
regarding confidentiality of customer lists, customer accounts and other
commercially valuable information. 68 The primary employment agreement
also contained a commitment to binding arbitration of disputes before the
New York Stock Exchange under its rules. 69 The agreement also provided
that a preliminary injunction would be an appropriate remedy for a breach
of the agreement.70 The account executive confirmed the value of the
customer information in his custody by resigning, taking the customer data
with him to a competitor and beginning to solicit customers to leave Merrill
Lynch. 71
Despite the courts that had previously ruled that section 3 of the FAA
did not authorize preliminary injunctions in very similar facts involving
securities firms, the Eastern District of Virginia entered a preliminary
injunction barring further use of the customer data by the former Merrill
Lynch employee. 72 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the denial of
provisional remedies would reduce the arbitration process to a "hollow
formality" because the former employee would have used the customer
65 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983).
66 486 F. Supp. 283 (D.S.C. 1978).
67 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
68 See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1050-1051.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 1051 n.1.
71 See id. at 1051.
72 See id. at 1050 n.2 (citing such cases).
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list.73 The arbitration would be a hollow formality because the arbitrators
would be powerless to remedy the destruction of the employer's trade
secrets, and any damage remedy would amount to no more than a license
for conversion of the secrets to a marketing contact list.
2. Compuserve, Inc. v. Vigny International Finance Ltd.74
Compuserve licensed Vigny as a distributor of its on-line computer
services in South America and licensed the use of its trademarks, trade
names and other proprietary marks. 75 The relevant agreements contained a
commitment to arbitrate disputes under the rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce. 76 In the agreements, Compuserve as licenser
reserved the right to apply for injunctive relief against the licensee.77 A
dispute arose under the distribution and licensing agreements, and
Compuserve notified Vigny of its intent to terminate the agreements. 78
Vigny then sued in federal court in Ohio for an injunction barring an
alleged disconnection of service to six thousand customers in Argentina and
Chile, and Compuserve countersued for injunctive relief barring Vigny
from further use of its trademarks and tradename. 79
The district court ruled that the agreements contemplated provisional
remedies to protect Compuserve's intellectual property and ICC arbitration
to preserve all the rights of both parties.80 Further explaining the
relationship of court-ordered and arbitral remedies, the court ruled that its
injunctive inquiry would "center[ upon the irreparable harm element" and
would not bind the arbitrators. 81
The district court's final resolution of these issues, if any, is not
reported. However, it is important to note that both Vigny and Compuserve
73 Id. at 1053-1054. Demonstrating its concern for preservation of full arbitral
authority, the appeals court also noted that the arbitrators would have the authority to
alter the injunction, or to eliminate it. See id. at 1054.
74 760 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
75 See Compuserve, 760 F. Supp. at 1275.
76 See id. at 1276-1277.
77 See id. at 1277.
78 See id. at 1275-1276.
79 See id. at 1276.
80 See id. at 1278.
81 Id. at 1282.
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asserted rights to continued use of the trademarks and tradename.8 2 Both
licenser and licensee had a stake in a prompt ruling and had indicated that
interest in the agreements. (Presumably, it was also of some importance to
the users of Compuserve/Vigny in Argentina and Chile that the district
court rule on the continued use of Compuserve's intellectual property.)
Thus, Compuserve helpfully identifies the stakeholders whose interests are
affected by the presence or absence of a provisional remedy in a trademark
case. Once a dispute arises, the licenser and the licensee will resort to self-
help (such as unilateral disconnection of service) or other action to preserve
what they view as their rights to the intellectual property. Compuserve
demonstrates that, even in cases where the parties have specifically
discussed and negotiated agreements that deal with provisional remedies,
the courts should be available to preserve the material rights of all the
parties until the arbitrators can act.83 In the absence of a timely legal
remedy, the parties' natural tendency to attempt to strengthen their
positions for arbitration, or to attempt to pressure the opponent into
capitulation, may result in serious erosion of the property in dispute.
3. Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc. 84
Ferry-Morse Seed Company (Ferry-Morse) entered into an exclusive
license agreement with Food Corn, which gave Ferry-Morse the exclusive
right to market a new strain of seed corn. 85 The license agreement also
contained an arbitration clause. 86 Ferry-Morse began to market the seed
corn and a dispute arose. 87 Food Corn evidently stopped supplying the seed
corn immediately before a prime sales season, and Ferry-Morse applied to
82 See id. The district court observed that Compuserve could only obtain an
injunction against Vigny's use by proving a proper termination of the licenses. See id. at
1282 n. 1.
83 "[A]ny injunctive relief which could be granted would be that of either
maintaining or not maintaining the status quo of the parties pending said arbitration."
Id. at 1282.
84 729 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1984).
85 See Ferry-Morse, 729 F.2d at 590-591.
86 Although the opinion does not say so, it is presumably correct that the new strain
of corn was protected under the Plant Variety Protection Act, a part of the U.S. patent
law system. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1994).
87 See Ferry-Morse, 729 F.2d at 590.
522
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the district court for an injunction requiring Food Corn to continue
supplying seed corn to Ferry-Morse pending arbitration. 88
It is not clear if Food Corn resisted arbitration, but the district court
crafted an order requiring Food Corn to continue supplying the seed corn,
prohibiting the sale of the seed to any person other than Ferry-Morse and
compelling arbitration. 89 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 90 The appeals court
reasoned that without an injunction, Ferry-Morse's seed business would be
irreparably harmed, the efficacy of arbitration would be "drastically
impaired" and economic waste would occur. 91
Because the seed corn was going to be sold to companies other than
Ferry-Morse, the only "economic waste" that was in view was the nearly
complete erosion of the intellectual property rights that Ferry-Morse had
acquired under its exclusive license from Food Corn. Ferry-Morse, through
arbitration, might have eventually obtained a damage remedy for its lost
investment in marketing one particular strain of corn, but Ferry-Morse
could not thereby recover its market position.
Feny-Morse demonstrates an instance where the failure of provisional
remedies would have been fatal to the existence of a form of intellectual
property-in this case the exclusive license. Perhaps Food Corn could have
obtained a higher price for its seed corn from another buyer, or perhaps it
could have obtained other economic advantages by declining to perform its
license obligations. It is even possible to suggest that Ferry-Morse could
have been required to seek "cover" in the seed corn market under Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 92 However, on the facts of this case,
these economic advantages could only be achieved at the cost of
dismantling the expectations of parties to exclusive licensing agreements.
By saying that it was acting against "economic waste," the appeals court
confirmed that it viewed the continued public validity of licensing
88 See id. at 591.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 593. The decision is notable for the fact that it does not cite or discuss
another Eighth Circuit panel's decision barring provisional remedies under the FAA,
which was decided only three months before Ferry-Morse. See Peabody Coalsales Co.
v. Tampa Elec. Co., 36 F.3d 46, 47 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming a provisional remedy);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1984).
91 See Ferry-Morse, 729 F.2d at 592-593.
92 See U.C.C. § 2-716. If the seeds were unique, the common law remedy of
replevin might have been preserved under U.C.C. § 2-716(1). See Sedmak v. Charlie's
Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. App. 1981) (holding that one particular
automobile is subject to replevin). Replevin is a provisional remedy available under rule
64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 64; Reichert, supra
note 6, at 371.
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agreements for intellectual property to be a greater good than the value to
be achieved by allowing the licenser to pursue a breach.
4. Performance Unlimited v. Questar Publishing, Inc. 93
In 1989, an agreement was entered between Performance, as the owner
of certain copyrights, and Questar, as the intended publisher. 94 An
arbitration clause called for binding arbitration before three arbitrators
chosen through a drawn-out series of mediations, prayers and ad hoc
selection of arbitrators by the parties. Publication and royalty payments
commenced, and a dispute arose in the summer of 1994.95 Questar ceased
payment of royalties to Performance, instead choosing to place the royalties
in an escrow account opened in July 1994.96 Suit was fied by Performance
seeking a preliminary injunction to force the payment of royalties during
arbitration. The preliminary injunction was denied. 97
The appeals court reversed and remanded for entry of an injunction
requiring the payment of a portion of the royalties sufficient to maintain
Performance as a viable business during the arbitration. 98 The court held
that injunctive relief was essential to prevent Questar from using the escrow
mechanism to deprive Performance of the value of the copyright
agreement. 99 By strategic use of the escrow option, Questar minimized its
exposure to a damage award while at the same time exerting tremendous
financial pressure on Performance, which needed the royalties to stay in
business.
Performance Unlimited demonstrates the need for provisional remedies
in copyright disputes that are subject to arbitration. While a hard-bitten
commercial attorney might have drafted an arbitration clause that would not
involve extensive bilateral cooperation in selection of an arbitration panel,
many such ad hoc arbitration contracts exist.100 While the parties attempted
93 52 F.3d 1373 (6th Cir. 1995).
94 See Performance Unlimited, 52 F.3d at 1376.
95 See id. at 1377.
96 See id. at 1375-1376.
97 See id. at 1377.
98 See id. at 1386.
99 See id.
10 0 Permanent institutional arbitrators such as the American Arbitration Association
can take time to appoint a panel, and the availability of provisional remedies can be
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to resolve the dispute under the contract, the licensee took advantage of the
delay and attempted to force a rearrangement of property rights through the
escrow device. Having permitted publication for five years, the copyright
owner could not vindicate its property other than through the courts.
Because the intellectual property was in the joint possession of both parties,
only a provisional remedy could restore the material rights of both parties
pending the arbitration.
5. Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc. 101
Sauer-Getriebe arose from a dispute between White Hydraulics, an
Indiana corporation, and Sauer-Getriebe, a German partnership, over the
benefits of a joint venture operating in the United States.' 0 2 The joint
venture agreement specified that the parties' jointly-created intellectual
property (trade secrets, patents, know-how) was assigned to Sauer-Getriebe
in forty-five countries.10 3 The parties also elected binding arbitration in
London under the rules of the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) in
Paris. 104 In evident contravention of the agreement, White allegedly began
negotiating to sell the joint venture's intellectual property to a third
party. l0 5
Sauer-Getriebe filed suit in the federal district court in Indiana
requesting a preliminary injunction pending arbitration. 106 The district
court denied the preliminary injunction and enjoined the German
partnership from proceeding with the ongoing arbitration.' 0 7 Having denied
any effective remedy to Sauer-Getriebe, the district court made adverse
findings of fact, holding that its findings were binding on any eventual
arbitrators and ordered the selection of a new arbitrator.108
The Seventh Circuit reversed each of these rulings.109 Finding that the
ICA rules allowed provisional remedies, the appeals court held that the
important to allow time for the selection of unbiased experts to be carried out. See
Redfern, supra note 30, at 83.
101 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983).





107 See id. Evidently, the district court judge believed that filing a demand for
arbitration in Paris was inconsistent with arbitration in London.
108 See id. at 350-351.
109 See id. at 352.
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district court had no lawful basis for denial of injunctive relief. The appeals
court also ruled that the trial court had no power to interfere with the
arbitration conducted by the ICA in Paris or London, or to bind the
arbitrators in factual or remedial matters. 110 Specifically finding that Sauer-
Getriebe's intellectual property rights would be undone without injunctive
relief, the appeals court directed the district court to enter an injunction
blocking the attempted sale. 111
The utter failure of injunctive relief in the U.S. trial court in Sauer-
Getriebe illustrates the importance of that form of relief to any person
considering the location of a research and development joint venture in the
United States. Were the district court's remarkable set of rulings to become
the prevailing law, German and American companies would be well-
advised not to site in the United States any competitively valuable research
and development. 112 Competitively valuable research and development is,
by definition, vulnerable to theft or other diversion of the intellectual
property developed by the project. 113 Because arbitrators sitting in London
could not expect to halt illegal acts in the United States without the
assistance of an American court, 114 the refusal of American courts to
protect intellectual property rights would greatly erode those rights. The
availability of an eventual monetary award against the Indiana corporation,
which would presumably be enforceable under the New York Convention,
would be a hollow remedy. Sauer-Getriebe would have a damage award
where instead it should have had all the lawful, long-term commercial
advantages (in forty-five countries) that were designed to flow from the
joint venture. 115
The Sauer-Getriebe case also illustrates the pressing need for clarity in
the law governing provisional remedies; the Germans should not have had
110 See id. at 351-352.
111 See id. at 350.
112 The solution of situating the joint venture in the United States and not electing
arbitration would expose the joint venture to all of the features of the U.S. legal system
that are unattractive to international investors. However, Congress has established a
public policy of allowing actors in interstate or international commerce to choose the
extent to which their legal disputes are grist for the mills of American courts. See
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 510-511 (1974).
113 See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-788, supra note 1.
114 See Born, supra note 10, at 813-823.
115 See Sauer-Getriebe, 715 F.2d at 351-352 (providing analysis of irreparable
harm).
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to wait for relief from the Seventh Circuit, and the defaulting party should
not have been able to confuse the issues in the district court with arguments
about provisional remedies.
6. Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz Aktiengesellschaft v. Hewitt-
Robins Division of Litton Systems, Inc. 116
An intellectual property license agreement was entered into by a
German and an American company concerning manufacturing processes
for a crushing device. An ICA arbitration clause was included in the
parties' agreements. 117 At the conclusion of the agreed term, the American
company continued to use the now unlicensed intellectual property to
manufacture a device that competed with that offered by the German
company. 118 After receiving evidence of continued infringement, the
district court concluded that effective provisional remedies were not
available in the arbitration proceedings 19 and enjoined any further
infringing uses of the intellectual property. 120
The Klockner case fully illustrates the need for provisional remedies to
preserve intellectual property rights in arbitration. For whatever reason,
provisional relief was not available from the arbitral panel. In the absence
of an effective provisional remedy, the arbitral panel can be assumed to be
prepared to award monetary damages for unlicensed use, but this simply
means that the owner of the intellectual property has been compelled to
involuntarily share the intellectual property in the United States, and that
the arbitrators have set the fee for the use. Klockner is especially clear on
this point, as the license agreement had expired, and a monetary damage
award would have served as a fee for an involuntary extension.
The foregoing cases, from Bradley to Klockner, demonstrate that
intellectual property is subject to severe erosion of its content if provisional
remedies are not available. In each of these cases, the courts had available
complete bodies of law to define the parties' rights, and but for the parties'
commitment to arbitration, would have had no difficulty providing
116 486 F. Supp. 283 (D.S.C. 1978).
117 See id. at 284 n.1.
118 See id. at 285.
119 See id. at 284 n.1. The court did not explain this holding, or the added
statement that certain tort causes of action were not appropriate for arbitration. See id.
120 See id. at 287-288.
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provisional relief.121 Were it not for the misunderstanding of the FAA and
the New York Convention in a minority of U.S. courts, there would be no
need for statutory amendment. However, as explained in the next section,
that misunderstanding is serious and unlikely to be resolved by the Supreme
Court.
IV. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION EMPOWER U.S. COURTS TO PROVIDE PROVISIONAL
RELIEF IN ARBITRATION MATTERS
The FAA was enacted in 1925 for the primary purpose of overcoming
the jealousy of courts, which had steadfastly refused to enforce agreements
to arbitrate. 122 Within ten years of enactment, the Supreme Court decided
two cases under the FAA, and in each case the Court reinforced the pro-
arbitration policies embedded in the statute. In the first case, Marine
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 123 the Court explained in some detail that the
lower courts should fully implement the jurisdictional mandate of the statute
and support the statutory command to refer parties to arbitration, rather
than court processes, when the parties had consented to arbitration in
writing. 124
In the second, more important case, The Anaconda v. American Sugar
Refining Co.,125 the Court dealt with a claim that a court-ordered pre-
arbitration attachment of a sea-going barge was improper, even though the
district court that ordered the attachment also referred the parties to
arbitration. The Supreme Court unanimously turned away the argument
that the district court was unable to order attachment of the vessel. The
Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction and equitable
authority over the attachment dispute under section 3 of the FAA, 126 and
121 See, e.g., Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468,
472 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing equitable factors); Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, 556 F.
Supp. 489, 494 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Jannort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F.
Supp. 1282, 1294-1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
122 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (stating
purpose of Act to overrule common law hostility to arbitration); S. REP. No. 68-536, at
1-2 (1924).
123 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
124 See id. at 274-275.
125 322 U.S. 42 (1943).
126 See id. at 44-45. The text of section 3 is as follows:
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had the substantive power to order a seizure of a maritime vessel, in aid of
arbitration, under section 8 of the FAA. 127
The Court's analysis is so straightforward and plainly stated that the
significance of the multiple holdings has not always been recognized. The
Court held that Congress had provided jurisdiction under section 3 of the
FAA for entry of the provisional remedy of attachment and for
consideration of a motion to compel arbitration. 128 There is every reason to
believe that the Supreme Court would have vacated the order attaching the
barge if jurisdiction under section 3 of Article I was not plain on the face
of the pleadings.129 Thus, The Anaconda stands for the proposition that
district courts have the statutory power to enter provisional remedies under
the FAA.130
The first appeals court opinion addressing provisional remedies after
The Anaconda arose in the Second Circuit. Murray Oil Products Co. v.
Mitsui & Co. Ltd.131 concerned an award of provisional relief to a United
States company that was in dispute with a Japanese supplier of oil. Relying
on The Anaconda and the plain provisions of the FAA, Judge Learned
Hand ruled that the provisional relief provided by the trial court was
consistent with the intent to arbitrate and with expeditious arbitration, and
that the provisional relief also made it more likely that the arbitration would
be successful. 132
After this initial Second Circuit case, there have been six opinions of
the Second Circuit affirming the entry of provisional remedies under the
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
127 See The Anaconda, 322 U.S. at 44-45.
128 See id. at 45-46.
129 See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
130 See Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie, 430 F. Supp. 88, 92
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (following The Anaconda despite later cases rejecting provisional
remedies under FAA).
131 146 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1944).
132 See id. at 384.
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FAA. 133 A majority of district court decisions in the Second Circuit have
followed the rule of The Anaconda and Murray Oil.'13
Published orders in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have affirmed the availability of
provisional remedies under the FAA. 135 The D.C. Circuit and the Federal
Circuit seem not to have addressed the issue. 136 In one case, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that the availability of a status quo injunction may be
133 See Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d
1049, 1052 (2d Cir. 1990); Roso-Lino Beverage Distrib. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 749 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1984); Connecticut Resources Recovery Auth. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 705 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1983); Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v.
Government of Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1982); Guinness-Harp Corp. v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 1980); Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1066-1067 (2d Cir. 1972). One Second Circuit
case accepted the availability of provisional remedies, but reversed the district court's
order requiring a party to post security during an arbitration. See Greenwich Marine v.
S.S. Alexandra, 339 F.2d 901, 903-904 (2d Cir. 1965).
134 Nonmaritime cases include JAB Indus., Inc. v. Silex S.P.A., 601 F. Supp. 971,
979 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that provisional remedies are not generally available);
Klein Sleep Prods., Inc. v. Hillside Bedding Co., 563 F. Supp. 904, 906-907
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282,
1294 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Maritime cases include Cordoba Shipping Co. v. Maro
Shipping Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 183, 188 (D. Conn. 1980); Andros Compania Maritima,
S.A. v. Andre & Cie, 430 F. Supp. 88, 92-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Coastal States
Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Navigation, 446 F. Supp. 330, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Albatross
S.S. Co. v. Mannin Bros., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); The Sydfold, 25 F.
Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
135 See Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers, Inc., 52 F.3d 1373,
1377-1380 (6th Cir. 1995); Peabody Coalsales Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 36 F.3d 46, 47
(8th Cir. 1994); Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. v. Robinson, 12 F.3d 515, 521
(5th Cir. 1994); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano, 999 F.2d 211,
214 (7th Cir. 1993); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 812
(3rd Cir. 1989); PMS Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Huber & Suhner, A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 642
(9th Cir. 1988); RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assoc., Inc., 858 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir.
1988); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dutton, 844 F.2d 726, 727-728
(10th Cir. 1988); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 51 (lst Cir. 1986);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1052 (4th Cir.
1985); Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1984).
136 The author could not locate cases addressing provisional remedies under the
patent arbitration statute.
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dependent on a contractual clause requiring the parties to maintain the
status quo during arbitration. 137
A published decision in the Eighth Circuit and an unpublished order in
the Tenth Circuit hold that no provisional remedies may be provided under
the FAA. 138 These cases, and a few district court cases, 139 assert that once
a court has ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, the court is
divested of jurisdiction under the FAA. These cases do not follow the
Supreme Court's ruling in The Anaconda, and all of them appear to be
incorrect.
A few state courts have ruled on the availability of provisional remedies
under the FAA. The state appeals courts are divided, with New York,
Florida and Texas adhering to a rule against provisional remedies, 140 and a
handful of other states favoring provisional remedies under the FAA. 141
These state cases are important, not only because New York, Florida and
Texas are major commercial states, but also because of the apparent
frequency with which arbitrations occur in those states. 142 The split
137 See RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assoc., Inc., 858 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1988).
138 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286,
1292 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Scott, No.
83-1480 (10th Cir. May 12, 1983)). As noted in note 90, supra, there are two published
panel decisions in the Eighth Circuit that either do not cite or distinguish the Hovey
decision, and which affirm provisional remedies under the FAA.
139 See Protane Gas Co. v. Sony Consumer Prod. Co., 613 F. Supp. 215, 218-219
(D.P.R. 1985); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shubert, 577 F. Supp.
406, 407-408 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
DeCaro, 577 F. Supp. 616, 623-625 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Smith v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 904, 905 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. 1472, 1478-1479 (E.D. Mo.
1983).
140 See Kom v. Ambassador Homes, Inc., 546 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1243 (N.Y.
1982); Galtey v. Underwood, Nenhaus and Co., 700 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. App.
1985); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Maghsoudi, 682 S.W.2d 593,
595 (Tex. App. 1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 666
S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex. App. 1984).
141 See Davenport v. Blue Cross of California, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 641, 649 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. District Court of Denver,
672 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Colo. 1983); Langston v. National Media Corp., 617 A.2d 354,
357-358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
142 These same states have adopted statutes to provide provisional remedies in
international arbitrations, evidently because they wish to attract international arbitration
business. See Walker, supra note 55, at 419 n.1 (Texas and Florida) and n.46 (New
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between the New York state courts and the federal courts in the Second
Circuit can also lead to fairly gross cases of forum shopping. 143
A. Tendency to Avoid Review in Supreme Court Due to Passage of
Time and Decision by Arbitrators
The issue of the availability of provisional relief under the FAA is one
which frequently arises but tends to evade review by the Supreme Court.
By the time trial and appeals court proceedings are complete and a
certiorari petition has been filed, the vast majority of commercial
arbitrations are completed or settled. Thus, despite the urging of a number
of commentators over the years, there has been no Supreme Court ruling
on this issue in sixty-three years, and it seems unlikely that the Court will
have an opportunity to address the matter in the normal course of
commercial arbitration. 144
Thus, under the FAA, there is a minor division in the federal and state
appeals courts on the availability of provisional remedies. Even in the
minority of the circuits where provisional remedies are in doubt, there is
substantial authority for enforcing express provisions in contracts which
call for such remedies. Although a majority of the courts have followed the
statute and the Supreme Court's ruling in The Anaconda in favor of
provisional remedies, some courts simply will not provide the remedies to
arbitral parties.
York legislative act attempted to overrule Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, with
doubtful success).
143 Sperry Int'l. Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1982)
and Sperry hzt'l. Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 689 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982)
together describe an extended minuet in the state and federal courts of New York
involving provisional remedies and a $10 million letter of credit. The final ruling of the
Second Circuit affirmed the power of the arbitrators to resolve the entire issue,
regardless of the numerous rulings in state and federal court. See Sperry, 689 F.2d at
306-307.
144 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 469 U.S.
1127, 1130-1131 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
B. A Majority of Courts Provide Provisional Relief Under the New
York Convention
The Third and Fourth Circuits have ruled that provisional remedies are
not available under Article II(3) of the New York Convention. 145 The
leading case denying provisional remedies is McCreary Tire & Rubber Co.
v. CEAT, S.p.A. 146 The McCreary case involved a Pennsylvania
corporation in dispute with an Italian corporation over the interpretation of
a distribution agreement for trademarked goods. The agreement called for
final and binding arbitration under the rules of the International Court of
Arbitration. The Italian corporation successfully moved in federal district
court in Massachusetts for an order compelling arbitration. The
Pennsylvania corporation filed in state court in Pennsylvania for attachment
of funds of the Italian corporation, which were in the possession of Mellon
Bank in Pennsylvania. The state court issued the attachment and after
removal to the Western District of Pennsylvania, the district court denied a
motion to dissolve the attachment. At the time the district court refused to
dissolve the attachment, the ICA arbitration had already commenced. 147
The Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania district court erred in
taking any action after the parties had been ordered to arbitrate. Other than
dissolving the improper attachment, the district court had no power to order
provisional relief because Article 11(3) of the Convention required that the
parties be immediately referred to arbitration. The Third Circuit reasoned
that allowing provisional remedies would encourage the bypassing of
arbitration. 14 Without analysis, the Fourth Circuit followed McCreary on
this same point a few years later.149
The McCreary decision is wrong. The ICA Rules that the parties
elected in their contract specifically provide that the parties may seek
145 That Article provides:
The Court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall,
at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, art. 3, 21 U.S.T. 2519, 2519.
146 501 F.2d 1032, 1032 (3d Cir. 1974).
147 See id. at 1033-1035.
148 See id. at 1036-1037.
149 See I.T.A.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981).
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provisional or interim relief from courts, and that such action is not in
derogation of ICA arbitration. 150 Thus, a party cannot "bypass" ICA
arbitration by resorting to a court for provisional relief. Moreover, it is
clear that the national delegations that negotiated the New York Convention
intended to allow provisional remedies. 151 A number of commentators have
pointed out that, of all the courts to address the issue of provisional
remedies under the New York Convention, only a minority of American
courts have decided to deny provisional assistance to arbitral parties. 152 All
appellate decisions in other countries have ruled that the New York
Convention permits provisional relief. 153
The majority of American courts that have addressed the issue of
provisional remedies under the New York Convention have disagreed with
the Third and Fourth Circuits. 154 Thus, in Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk
150 ICA Article 8(5) provides that parties may resort to a "judicial tribunal" for
provisional relief without violating their promise to arbitrate. See Sauer-Getriebe KG v.
White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983) (interpreting same rule).
151 See Brower, supra note 10, at 1004-1021.
152 In addition to the Third and Fourth Circuit cases cited above, see McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Kingdom of Denmark, 607 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 1985)
finding that McCreary requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. See also Siderius, Inc.
v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, 453 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding
that McCreary requires dismissal); Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N.
Pertambangan Minjakdongas Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(finding that McCreary requires vacation of attachment).
153 See, e.g., Scherk Enterprises Aktiengesellschaft v. Societe des Grandes
Marques, Cass., 1977, 1979 Y.B. Com. Arb., 286 (Italy) (awarding provisional
remedies under New York Convention in trademark dispute).
154 In addition to the federal appeals court decisions cited in the text, a number of
district courts and state courts have held that provisional remedies are consistent with
the Convention. See, e.g., Remy Amerique Inc. v. Touzet Distrib. S.A.R.L., 816 F.
Supp. 213, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Filantro, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F.
Supp. 1229, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that McCreary is "facially absurd");
Compuserve, Inc. v. Vigny Int'l Finance Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 1273, 1281 (S.D. Ohio
1990); Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1329-1330 (M.D. Tenn.
1990); Atwood Navigation, Inc. v. M/V Rizal, CIV.A. 89-1221, 1989 WL 16306, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1989) (limiting McCreary to nonadmiralty cases); Rogers,
Burgun, Shahine & Deschler, Inc. v. Dongsan Constr. Co., 598 F. Supp. 754, 758
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Construction Exporting Enter. v. Nikki Maritime Ltd., 558 F. Supp.
1372, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Tampimex Oil Ltd. v. Latina Trading Corp., 558 F.
Supp. 1201, 1202-1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Paramount Carriers Corp. v. Cook Indus.,
Inc., 465 F. Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Atlas Chartering Serv. v. World Trade
Group, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Companiade Navegacion y
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Products Co., 155 the Second Circuit refused to follow McCreary in a
dispute arising from a trademark license agreement between an American
and a Japanese company. 156 The Fifth Circuit also declined to follow
McCreary in the 1989 case of E.A.S.T., Inc. v. M/VALALA, 157 where it
affirmed the arrest of a vessel as security for an eventual arbitration award.
The Seventh Circuit held in Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc.
that a provisional remedy was essential to preservation of the rights of a
German company engaged in a joint venture with an American company,
and that the rules of the ICA specifically allowed injunctive relief pending
arbitration. 158
1. Provisional Relief Has Proved its Value in Intellectual
Property Cases
As demonstrated in the extended discussion above, the preservation of
prime dispute for arbitrators is the fundamental rule underlying a
provisional remedy. 159 The second rule is that the parties' material rights
must be preserved pending action by the arbitrators, even if this means
entry of an order requiring supervision by a court. 160
Financiera Bosnia, S.A. v. National Unity Marine Salvage Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1013,
1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie, 430 F.
Supp. 88, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp.
1044, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 1977); see also Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187
(1st Cir. 1982) (stating that Convention requires international standards of enforcement
in all courts).
155 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1990).
156 Other Second Circuit cases holding that provisional remedies are available
under the Convention are David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d
245, 248-249 (2d Cir. 1991) and Drys Shipping Corp. v. Freights, 558 F.2d 1050, 1052
(2d Cir. 1977).
157 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1989).
158 See Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 349-351 (7th
Cir. 1983).
159 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano, 999 F.2d 211,
215-216 (7th Cir. 1993); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756
F.2d 1048, 1053-1054 (4th Cir. 1985); Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 711 F.
Supp. 936, 939-940 (N.D. M1l. 1989).
160 See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 815 (3d Cir.
1989); PMS Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Huber & Suhner, A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir.
1988); Roso-Lino Beverage Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 126 (2d
Cir. 1984).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In all cases where provisional relief is deemed appropriate, the relief
must be measured and tailored to the precise dispute. For example, it must
end when arbitrators order it to end, and must not attempt to bind the
arbitrators or the parties; but it must also maintain secrecy or commercial
confidentiality during the arbitration if that is needed. 161
All of the appellate courts that have addressed the issue have agreed
that the availability of provisional remedies should be subject to the right of
commercial parties to define or exclude arbitral action.162 Thus, the courts
find that provisional remedies are appropriate in default of any contract
clause, but that the remedies are not mandatory. 163
2. Analyzing the Policy Arguments Against Provisional Remedies
Those courts that have denied the propriety of provisional remedies for
arbitral parties have advanced six policy arguments to support their
rulings. 164 These arguments are:
1. The essential nature of voluntary arbitration is inconsistent with
judicial interference. 165
161 See Peabody Coalsales Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 36 F.3d 46, 48 (8th Cir.
1994); Sauer-Getriebe, 715 F.2d at 349-351 (7th Cir. 1983); Andros Compania
Maritima S.A. v. Andre & Cie, 430 F. Supp. 88, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
162 See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1066 (2d Cir.
1972); Remy Amerique Inc. v. Touzet Distrib., 816 F. Supp. 213, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
163 See RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assoc., 858 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1988)
(suggesting the need for contractual authorization of provisional remedies).
164 The arguments are analyzed under these same categories in Brower, supra note
10, at 983-986; see also Cynthia Jean Butler, Note, The Propriety of Judicially Granted
Provisional Relief in Pending Arbitration Cases, 9 O-mo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 145,
154-159 (1993).
165 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286,
1292 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that judicial inquiry relative to merits will invade province
of arbitrator assigned by parties); ); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S.p.A.,
501 F.2d 1032, 1038 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating that court will not permit "bypass" of
arbitration); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d, 1239, 1243 (N.Y.
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2. Attachment and other coercive, pre-award remedies are not
normally needed, as most parties comply with arbitration awards.1 66
3. An award may be enforced in any signatory nation under the
New York Convention.' 67
4. Private arbitral parties may contract for security through
performance bonds. 168
5. Subjecting foreign parties to U.S. courts and law is contrary to
the policy favoring uniform, international, private arbitration. 169
6. If U.S. courts provide provisional remedies, then foreign courts
will do the same and thereby subject American businesses to foreign
courts and remedies. 170
These policy concerns are misplaced. Addressing each in reverse
order, U.S. companies already benefit from the availability of provisional
remedies in every major commercial arbitration situs around the world. 171
The reciprocal availability of remedies fails only in some U.S.
166 See Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1242. The reverse of this theme is provided by Neil
E. McDonnell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in International Commercial
Arbitration, 22 COLUM. J. TRA1SNAT'L. L. 273 (1984), where it is asserted that the
courts should be careful not to encourage parties to circumvent or delay arbitration byjudicial consideration of provisional remedies. See id. at 273, 289. This illustrates the
point that while many parties may voluntarily comply throughout the arbitration
process, others will take advantage of the opportunity to confuse and delay the process.
For those parties' arbitral partners, provisional remedies may be the only means of
preserving the status quo pending an arbitral remedy. See, e.g, Performance Unlimited,
Inc. v. Questar Publishers, Inc., 52 F.3d 1373, 1376 (6th Cir. 1995).
167 See Cooper, 442 N.E. 2d at 1242.
168 See id.
169 See id. This argument is elaborated in Andrew S. Holmes, Pre-Award
Attachment Under the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 792 (1981) and John B. Yellot, Jr.,
Attachment Under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 36 WASH. & L E L. REv. 1135, 1141-1142 (1979).
170 See McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038 (stating that state-by-state procedural
variations should be avoided in international arbitrations); Cooper, 442 N.E.2d at 1243.
171 See Survey of International Arbitration Sites (J. Stewart McClendon ed.,
American Arbitration Ass'n 1993) [hereinafter McClendon Survey].
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jurisdictions. 172 International arbitration practice supports provisional
remedies for arbitral parties and is not undermined by consideration of such
remedies before arbitrators are appointed.173
Suggesting that arbitral parties contract for performance bonds if they
want security in contracts is a complete negation of the freedom to choose
the extent to which arbitration is utilized to reduce the costs of contracting
and of dispute resolution. 174
The second and third policy objections to provisional remedies are
based on the assertion that the "normal" arbitration award is either
voluntarily complied with, or is enforceable under the New York
Convention. These arguments are logically flawed in that the presumed
intent of the "normal" party is no basis for establishing rules of procedure
to govern all cases. 175 Moreover, a provisional remedy is normally needed
against a recalcitrant party and serves to preserve the fundamental issues
for the arbitrator. Provisional remedies are especially important during the
period before appointment of the arbitrator, when the parties' intent to
comply with an eventual order is speculative at best. 176
The remaining policy argument concerns the voluntary "essence" of
arbitration and its supposed inconsistency with judicial "interference"
through provisional remedies. The argument is based on the false premise
that there is a binary, either/or separation between court and arbitral
processes. Either there is arbitration or there is "bypass." All private
arbitration is contractual and thus is dependent on court processes for
172 See Kevin J. Brody, Note, An Argument for Pre-Award Attachment in
International Arbitration Under the New York Convention, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 99,
111 n.74 (1985).
173 The international arbitration rules that support provisional remedies are
discussed supra, note 58. The enforcement of remedies awarded by arbitrators is
outside the scope of this paper. For a discussion of the complexities of that subject, see
BORN, supra note 10, at 813-823.
174 See Brower, supra note 10, at 984 n.80. Moreover, a performance bond or a
standby letter of credit backing performance will not necessarily avoid the dispute or the
need for provisional remedies. See Sperry Int'l Trade v. Government of Israel, 689
F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing provisional remedies dispute in arbitration over
standby letter of credit provided as form of security).
175 By the same reasoning, injunctions would not be available to enforce school
desegregation orders because the "normal" state or local official will obey legal rulings.
176 See Charles N. Brower & W. Michael Tupman, Court-Ordered Provisional
Measures Under the New York Convention, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 33-34 (1986).
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compulsion and enforcement. 177 Under the "essence" objection, courts
would not order arbitration, 178 the appointment of arbitrators179 or the
attendance of witnesses.180
The essence of arbitration is not arbitral exclusivity, but a mix of
judicial and arbitral authority, which the FAA and the New York
Convention define in some detail. The "essence" argument disregards this
mix and does not address at all those cases where the parties to an
arbitration agreement expressly authorize judicial provisional relief, thus
illustrating that arbitration is not purely private.' 8 ' Where an arbitration
contract bars any resort to court, the FAA plainly requires a court to refuse
a request for provisional remedies, but that exception should not bar all
such remedies.182
Because these policy objections are misplaced, the refusal of
provisional remedies to arbitral parties amounts to hostility to arbitration,
which Congress should address.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD CLARIFY THE AVAILABILITY OF PROVISIONAL
RELIEF
The first needed statutory change is to amend section 3 of the FAA, 183
dealing with arbitrations in interstate commerce, to add the following at the
end of that section:
177 See BERGER, supra note 59, at 347-351.
178 But see 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 206 (1994).
179 But see 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
180 But see 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
181 See, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Vigny Int'l Finance Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 1273
(S.D. Ohio 1990). One writer extends the "essence" argument by asserting that state
court entry of provisional remedies which are not expressly authorized by contract is an
"impairment" of contract under the United States Constitution. See Butler, supra note
164, at 157. This assertion is incorrect for several reasons. As acknowledged in this
Note, the FAA and the New York Convention are not state laws under the Contracts
Clause. See id. at 157 n.79. Moreover, through the FAA, Congress made additional
remedies for enforcement of arbitration contracts, and the statute has been in place since
1925. Contracts are presumed to be subject to the contract remedy laws in force at the
time they are created. See United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977). Thus a contract entered in the last 72 years could not even
theoretically be impaired by the FAA.
182 Section 4 of the FAA, requires the courts to enforce an arbitration agreement
"according with the terms thereof." See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
183 See supra note 126 for current text of section 3.
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Prior to the appointment of an arbitrator, provisional or interim relief
may also be ordered by the court, except where excluded by the written
agreement of the parties. Any order for provisional or interim relief
will be subject to the appointed arbitrator's power to alter or withdraw
such relief.
This amendment to section 3 would overrule the minority of courts that
have interpreted the FAA as not permitting courts to entertain motions for
provisional relief. It would also preserve the parties' freedom to restrict or
prohibit requests for provisional remedies and otherwise enlist the courts in
supporting arbitration to the extent that the parties have elected that form of
dispute resolution. The other statutory amendment should occur in chapter
2 of the FAA, which implements the New York Convention in the United
States Code. Section 206 of the FAA is the counterpart of section 3 for
international arbitrations and should have the same additional sentences
added at its end. 184
A. Policy Arguments Favoring Clarification
1. The Argument from Legal Certainty
The policy arguments in support of the proposed amendments follow
from the discussion of the current state of commercial arbitration law and
practice. Parties entering into contracts for arbitration of disputes should
know whether their agreements will be enforced while their preferred
arbitration machinery is being engaged. Legal certainty, to the extent that a
legal system can provide certiainty, is a basis for the most efficient
allocation of resources through private contracts and private negotiations.
Parties entering into international contracts can elect to arbitrate their
184 The current text of section 206, with the additional text in italics, is as follows:
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in
accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that
place is within or without the United States. Such court may also appoint
arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Prior to the
appointment of an arbitrator, provisional or interim relief may also be ordered by
the court, except where excluded by the written agreement of the parties. Any
order for provisional or interim relief will be subject to the appointed arbitrator's
power to alter or withdraw such relief.
9 U.S.C. § 206 (1994) (with suggested amendment in italics).
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disputes in other countries in order to obtain a desired level of certainty.
The original intent of the New York Convention was clearly to provide
provisional remedies through national courts in any signatory country.' 85
Thus, legal certainty was to have been obtained originally through uniform
international law. Because the United States is the only signatory country
where an appellate court has declined to support provisional remedies, 186 it
is up to the United States to correct the problem.
The costs of the present level of uncertainty include needless
expenditures of attorney's fees and other transaction and litigation costs,
which may cause commercial arbitration parties to seek non-United States
fora for arbitration. Given the intense competition between sites for
arbitration,18 7 the parties may well decide to avoid the additional costs that
may be incurred through uncertainty.
Another instance of waste caused by the split in U.S. legal authorities is
the forum shopping within U.S. jurisdictions that occurs when parties have
committed to arbitration in the United States. Because the federal district
courts of Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, West
Virginia, North Carolina and South Caroliha must refuse provisional
remedies under the New York Convention, 88 a party that believes a
provisional remedy is necessary in a particular case will work strenuously
to avoid those courts and find a way to file suit in other districts. This is a
wasteful expenditure of resources that could be avoided by a uniform
national rule.
Of course, it could be argued that legal certainty would also be served
by a rule prohibiting arbitration parties from seeking provisional remedies
in any court. This certainty is not desirable, however, because it would
amount to a return to the pre-1925 era of hostility to arbitration. So long as
parties to business disputes avoided arbitration, provisional relief would be
185 See Brower, supra note 10, at 1009-1020.
186 See generally McClendon Survey, supra note 171 (reporting that Australia, 16,
Canada, 32, Egypt, 38, France, 45, Germany, 53, Japan, 64, Malaysia, 73, Mexico,
80, Netherlands, 87, Singapore, 94, Sweden, 100, Switzerland, 107 and the United
Kingdom, 115 have provisional remedies available to arbitral parties). The United States
is reported as a jurisdiction of doubtful certainty on this issue. See id. at 123, 137;
Brody, supra note 172 (collecting cases from various countries).
187 See McClendon Survey, supra note 171.
188 These are the states in the Third and Fourth Circuits. The federal district courts
in those states are bound by McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d
1032, 1032-1037 (3d Cir. 1974) and LT.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d
75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981).
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available from a court. This is precisely the type of court refusal to support
the choice of arbitration that Congress overruled in 1925.189
2. Argument from Comparative U.S. Economic Advantage
The need for provisional remedies in commercial arbitration, subject to
control by the contracting parties, has been affirmed by the judgment of
drafters of treaties, arbitration rules, recent state legislation and model
arbitration acts. 190 When advising on the location of business operations in
which the reliable development and exploitation of intellectual property is a
material factor, careful attorneys would be well-advised to counsel
avoidance of jurisdictions where provisional remedies are not available. As
demonstrated in the discussion in Section mH, jurisdictions that refuse such
remedies can not adequately protect the exclusive use rights of intellectual
property stakeholders.
The lack of clearly available provisional remedies may now discourage
owners of emergent forms of intellectual property from basing full
exploitation of the property in the United States. Certainly, any investor (or
counsel) who has read some of the court decisions discussed above would
seek to draft an agreement that would avoid a jurisdiction that refused such
remedies.191 However, the drafting solutions identified to date are
incomplete at best. 192 To the extent that owners of intellectual property are
influenced by flaws in national legal systems, a correction of this flaw
189 See supra note 122 for legislative history of FAA.
190 See generally supra Section I.
191 This might be done by specifying that the arbitration agreement is governed by
the New York Convention and that the only permissible venue for arbitration would be
New York City. This would situate the arbitration hearing in the Second Circuit, but it
would not prevent a recalcitrant opposing party from filing a blocking action in New
York state court, which would then be removed, or in a jurisdiction where provisional
remedies are not available. See, e.g., Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel,
689 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing numerous New York state actions
removed to federal court during arbitration); McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1033 (describing
actions in district court in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania); see also Brower, supra
note 10, at 1002-1003; Reichert, supra note 6, at 695-696.
192 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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would serve to encourage the location of new intellectual property
investments in the United States. 193
Intellectual property stakeholders would be encouraged to situate new
r&d investments in the United States because of (1) the increased likelihood
that full protection of all aspects of intellectual property would occur in the
event of opportunistic behavior by an opponent; (2) a contractual election
for or against provisional remedies by commercial parties would be
honored, thus permitting the most knowledgeable persons to control the
uses of the property; 194 (3) emergent and experimental forms of intellectual
property, which would appear to be the most sensitive to erosion and
destruction through loss of confidentiality, would be fully protected; 195 (4)
193 To protect industries that are dependent on intellectual property, in the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Congress took the extraordinary step of authorizing
the Attorney General to seek civil injunctive remedies as well as criminal penalties
against actions that illegally compromise trade secrets. See Economic Espionage Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294 § 1, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, supra
note 1, at 13-14 (describing need for injunctive power); see also J.T. Westermeier, Jr.,
Two New Laws Aid Attorneys in Combating Trade Secret Theft, 13 COMPUTER L.
STRATEGIST 1, 3 (1996) (describing new injunctive powers).
194 As drafted, the proposed statutory amendments would permit contracting
arbitral parties to bar courts from entertaining suits for provisional remedies. This is a
default rule, meaning that it would apply in the absence of an election by the parties.
This is common in arbitration legislation and is the central premise of the FAA, which
requires the courts to enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms. See 9
U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
195 A comparison to section 365(m) of the Bankruptcy Act may be appropriate in
support of this policy argument. Section 365(m) was enacted by Congress to overrule an
unfortunate decision of the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). See Pub. L. No. 100-506 § l(b), 102
Stat. 2538 (1988). The Lubrizol decision allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to treat
intellectual property licenses as executory contracts that the trustee could affirm and
perform, or disaffirm and not perform, to the extent that the trustee deemed
performance to be profitable to the bankruptcy estate. Congress reversed this ruling by
enacting section 365(m). In so doing, Congress explained its views of the importance of
intellectual property in the developing American economy, and the role of courts in
upholding the expectations of parties to intellectual property agreements through specific
enforcement:
Licensing of technology, which the bill is intended to protect and to facilitate, plays a
substantial role in the process of technological development and innovation. That
process begins with an inventive concept and must proceed through an expensive and
risky series of steps including research, development, manufacturing and marketing. At
each step, both money and additional refinement of the idea are required. Often, the
financing and additional refinement are only available through the participation of
persons other than the original innovator.
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the availability of provisional remedies will discourage theft, diversion and
counterfeiting of intellectual property by third parties acting in concert with
employees or agents of contracting parties; 196 and (5) the ephemeral and
easily-transported nature of intellectual property which strongly suggests
that there may be a need for rapid court action to preserve evidence or to
buttress the secret aspects of the property. 197
Licensing provides the mechanism by which the original innovator can retain sufficient
ownership of his innovation .... Licensing also provides a mechanism whereby the
innovator who has identified more than one domain in which his invention may have
application can seek partners .... In order to assure the continued availability of the
intellectual property against the contingency of the creator's bankruptcy, however, the
party seeking the intellectual property for limited use must demand assignment .... If
the creator is unwilling to assign, in some instances, transactions simply are not
completed .... The bill corrects the perception of some courts that Section 365 was
ever intended to be a mechanism for stripping innocent licensee[s] of rights central to
the operations of their ongoing businesses and stripping the American licensing system
of its dependability and flexibility.
S. REP. No. 100-505, at 3-4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3202, 3203.
The effect of section 365(m), in addition to overruling Lubrizol, is to empower
federal bankruptcy courts to specifically enforce intellectual property licenses in
bankruptcy, and to order the trustee in bankruptcy to perform license obligations. See
id. at 11-14 (letter from Commerce Department General Counsel in support of S.1626
was enacted as section 365(m)).
There is a strong practical comparison between the lack of specific enforcement of
intellectual property licenses under Lubrizol, and the lack of provisional remedies for
arbitration in some U.S. courts. Congress should be equally impressed with the need to
correct the flaw in the FAA, as it has similar damaging consequences for the U.S.
intellectual property system.
196 See, e.g., Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz Aktiengesellschaft v. Litton Systems,
Inc., 486 F. Supp. 283, 283 (D.S.C. 1978).
197 This argument is strongly supported by analogy to the undisputed availability of
provisional remedies in domestic or international maritime arbitrations. See Colleen C.
Higgins, Interim Measures in Transnational Maritime Arbitration, 65 TUL. L. REV.
1519 (1991) (describing clear availability of provisional remedies in maritime matters).
Ships and vessels are inherently movable, and the evidence in a particular dispute is
likely to disperse when a ship's crew reaches port and disperses. See, e.g., E.A.S.T.,
Inc. v. M/V ALAIA, 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1989). Thus, provisional remedies such
as attachment and seizure can secure the immediate cooperation of all parties in taking
steps to preserve evidence and secure assets and thereby prevent a recalcitrant party
from rendering the eventual arbitral ruling a useless exercise.
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3. Argument from Obligations of International Law
As discussed above, 198 the original intent of the parties who drafted the
New York Convention of 1958 was to support the uniform availability of
provisional remedies in national courts. Appellate courts in other countries
have ruled that provisional remedies are available to arbitral parties.199 Of
the courts that have addressed the issue, it appears that only a minority of
U.S. courts has withheld such remedies. 200 As a result, the United States is
not in full compliance with the New York Convention, despite the
intentions of Congress to fully implement the Convention.20' By enacting
the proposed amendments, Congress can restore a uniform national and
international rule of law.
A number of commentators have pointed out that the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains a chapter dedicated to
intellectual property issues, and that a provision is included that requires
signatory countries to strengthen provisional remedies. 202 The United States
198 See Brower, supra note 10, at 1004-1021.
199 See, e.g. Scherk Enterprises Aktiengesellschaft v. Societe des Grandes
Marques, Cass., 1977, 1979 Y.B. Com. Arb., 286 (Italy); Note, The Use of Pre-
judgment Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in International Commercial
Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of the British and American
Approaches, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 667 (1989) (collecting British cases); McClendon
Survey, supra note 171 (surveying numerous countries).
200 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
201 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 510-511 (1974) (describing
Congressional intent to My implement New York Convention).
202 Article 1716 of NAFTA requires the signatory countries to provide provisional
remedies in intellectual property cases. See Robert Holleyman, Software Piracy Abroad:
Challenges and Opportunities, in PLI's SECOND ANNUAL INSTITtuTE FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 419, 441 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 453, 1996) (noting that NAFTA requires provisional
remedies to enforce patent rights); Gregory C. Ludlow, The Impact of NAFTA/WTO
(GAT) TRIPS Chapters on Trademark and Copyright Law: A Canadian Perspective, in
GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 1996: MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION 71, 73
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. 455, 1996); International Trade Info. Corp., Pharmaceuticals, 4 No. 7 MEX.
TRADE & L. REP. 24, 27 (1994); I. Fred Konigsberg & Joan T. Pinaire, Impact of
International Copyright Developments in U.S. Practice, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT 523, 544 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 393, 1994); Bruce Zagaris & Alvaro J. Aguilar,
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Protection Between Mexico and the United States:
A Precursor of Criminal Enforcement for Western Hemisphere Integration?, 5
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 41, 106-107 (1994).
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has ratified both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 203
and the related Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), including trade in counterfeit goods. 204 Article 50
of the TRIPS Agreement requires each national party to provide provisional
remedies to enforce and protect intellectual property rights.205 Thus,
although different jurisdictions have widely varying provisional remedies
for intellectual property, 206 those nations that commit to compliance with
TRIPS will be required to address provisional remedies under article 50.
The United States is required to provide a uniform national rule in its
courts in order to comply with article 50 and can do so by enacting the
amendments proposed above.207 From the perspective of compliance with
international legal obligations already assumed by the United States,
Congress should amend the FAA to clarify and unify the law of provisional
remedies.
203 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1.
204 See id. at 83.
205 See Laturno, supra note 3, at 376 and n.137; J.H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of
the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 363 (1995). The text of TRIPS Article 50, in
part, is as follows:
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and
effective provisional measures: (a) to prevent an infringement of any intellectual
property right from occurring, and in particular to prevent the entry into the
channels of commerce in their jurisdictions of goods, including imported goods
immediately after customs clearance; (b) to preserve relevant evidence in regard to
the alleged infringement.
2. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to adopt provisional
measures inaudita altera parte where appropriate, in particular where any delay is
likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there is a
demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.
33 I.L.M. 1, at 1216.
206 See Singer, supra note 46, at 67.
207 See Holleyman, supra note 202, at 441 (noting that TRIPS requires that judicial
authorities have injunctive power as a provisional remedy).
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
VI. CONCLUSION
The costs and benefits of the proposed amendments are clear. The costs
include the likelihood of occasional errors by courts that intervene in
private arbitral disputes without cause or which continue to intervene after
arbitrators have been appointed. This cost is minimized in the proposed
amendment by limiting court powers after an arbitrator is appointed.208 A
practice of rapid appellate review and reversal of errors would also reduce
this cost to a minimum. Another cost would include the perception by some
legal practitioners that arbitration is a secondary solution, later in time than
a resort to court. This cost should be minimized by the existing rule that
arbitration proceedings may not be stayed to allow a court to consider
provisional issues.209 A third cost would be contractual adjustments to
accommodate a newly clarified rule of provisional remedies. This is not
truly an additional cost, as commercial contracts are in a constant state of
flux among private parties, and only a minority of courts have adopted this
rule.
The benefits to be derived include increased certainty and clarity in
legal rules affecting commercial contracts and intellectual property, the
availability of a legal remedy for parties that demonstrate a need and the
attractions of broadened protection of intellectual property rights. As
Congress examines each opportunity to improve the intellectual property
system in the United States, this is an opportunity that should be acted on
without delay.
208 See supra note 184 for the proposed amendment to section 206 of the FAA.
209 See Sauer-Getriebe KG v. Wbite Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 351-352 (7th
Cir. 1983).

